Punishment and Procedure: A Different View of the American Criminal Justice System. by Pizzi, William T.




Punishment and Procedure: A Different View of
the American Criminal Justice System.
William T. Pizzi
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pizzi, William T., "Punishment and Procedure: A Different View of the American Criminal Justice System." (1996). Constitutional
Commentary. 1142.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/1142
PUNISHMENT AND PROCEDURE: A 
DIFFERENT VIEW OF THE AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
William T. Pizzi* 
In a recent issue of this journal, Professor Michael Seidman 
notes that while we have "the most elaborate and detailed consti-
tutional protections for criminal defendants of any country in the 
world," we also have "the second highest incarceration rate of 
any country in the world."l From these premises, he goes on to 
argue that our constitutional protections, which he views as "in-
tended to make prosecution more difficult," have been so weak-
ened that instead they "serve [to] make the prosecutor's job 
easier. "2 He complains that "the Fourth Amendment is so rid-
dled with exceptions and limitations that it rarely prevents the 
police from pursuing any reasonable crime control tactic";J that 
"judges have virtually gone out of the business of actually polic-
ing the voluntariness of confessions and regularly sanction the 
sort of coercive tactics that would have led to the suppression of 
evidence a half century ago";4 and that courts tolerate courtroom 
performances by counsel "that make a mockery of the formal 
protections [of the sixth amendment]."s 
The picture that Professor Seidman draws of a barbaric sys-
tem in which constitutional protections are not nearly as strong 
as they ought to be if they are to protect defendants from such a 
system might not seem the meat for a response. After all, his 
picture of the system was tossed off with broad brush strokes in a 
brief essay. But two reasons compel me to respond to Professor 
Seidman's picture of the system. The first is that this picture of a 
system of brutal unfairness is common in law review writing and 
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado. I want to thank Jane Thompson, the 
Faculty Service Librarian, for her assistance in this and other projects. I also wish to 
thank my research assistants, Ingrid Decker and David Cripe. 
1. Louis Michael Seidman, Criminal Procedure as the Servant of Politics, 12 Canst. 
Comm. 207, 207-08 (1995). 
2. Id. at 210. 
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is often used to justify extreme positions on legal issues. Con-
sider, for example, an essay by Professor David Luban, entitled 
Are Criminal Defenders Different?,6 in which he argued that a 
more aggressive level of advocacy is justified in criminal cases 
than is appropriate in civil cases because our criminal justice sys-
tem is so unfair. Like Professor Seidman, Professor Luban 
claimed that prosecutors "enjoy overwhelming procedural ad-
vantages"? over the defense in the American criminal justice sys-
tem. Again, like Professor Seidman, he considers the American 
criminal justice system to be overwhelmingly harsh in its sentenc-
ing of defendants. For Professor Luban, proof of the harshness 
of the system lies in the fact that we have "the dubious distinc-
tion of having a higher percentage of our population under lock 
and key than any nation in the world, including the pre-Glasnost 
Soviet Union, post-Tiananmen Square China, and pre-deK.lerk 
South Africa." He goes on to ask, "Is this 'political abuse'? I 
believe that it is."s 
My second reason for responding to Professor Seidman is 
that he offers this picture of a system that is terribly unfair to 
defendants at a time when broad segments of the public are an-
gry at the system for exactly the opposite reason. Statement af-
ter statement from victims complains angrily that the criminal 
justice system cares about little except the rights of defendants 
and systematically ignores the interests of victims or the broader 
public.9 These complaints are backed up by public opinion polls 
that show that the public has little confidence in the criminal jus-
tice system1o and very low respect for lawyers in general.n In the 
6. 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1729 (1993). 
7. Id. at 1736. 
8. Id. at 1749-50. 
9. See, e.g., Comment, Criminal Law - VICtim Rights: Remembering the "Forgot-
ten Person" in the Criminal Justice System, 70 Marq. L. Rev. 572 (1987) (citation omitted) 
("My life has been permanently changed. I will never forget being raped, kidnapped, and 
robbed at gunpoint. However, my sense of disillusionment with the judicial system is 
many times more painful. I could not, in good faith, urge anyone to participate in this 
hellish process."); Steve Baker, Justice Not Revenge: A Crime Victim's Perspective on 
Capital Punishment, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 339, 340 (1992) ("Like other family members of 
murder victims, I found myself excluded from the system, unable to participate in the 
formal proceedings. The criminal justice equation does not include the relatives or 
friends of victims."). 
10. A 1993 poll aimed at gauging public confidence in selected institutions showed 
that only 17% of the public had a high level of confidence in the criminal justice system. 
See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1992 164, table 
2.4 (U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1993). The same poll showed that 52% of the public had a high 
level of confidence in the police. Id. 
In 1989, in a Gallup public opinion survey, those polled were asked the following 
question, "In general, do you think the courts in your area deal too harshly, or not harshly 
enough with criminals?" Eighty-three percent responded "not harshly enough" to the 
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wake of recent high publicity cases, one wonders if public confi-
dence in the system might not sink to even lower levels. 
Because I believe that the picture offered by Professor Seid-
man is inaccurate, I want to criticize that view of the system and 
offer a different view, in which punishment and procedure are 
synergistically related. Readers can decide which view of the sys-
tem is more accurate, understanding of course that both pictures 
are painted with broad strokes. But even if readers disagree with 
the view of the system I will put forward, they will at least better 
understand the public anger directed at the system, because my 
view of the system is much closer to the views of the system of-
fered by victims and others outside the system than it is to the 
picture presented by Professor Seidman. 
I. A PRELIMINARY MATTER: JUDGING A SYSTEM 
BY ITS INCARCERATION RATES 
Both Professors Seidman and Luban make dramatic use of 
the high incarceration rate in the United States when compared 
with other western countries. In 1993 the United States had an 
incarceration rate of 519 citizens per 100,000.12 This is roughly 
ten and a half times that of the Netherlands (49), eight times that 
of Norway (62), six times that of Germany (80) and France (84), 
and five and a half times that of England/Wales (93).13 But while 
these statistics are sad and disturbing, are they a fair measure of 
how harshly particular defendants are actually sentenced and do 
they show a criminal justice system that is repressive and unjust? 
The answer is no. Because these figures do not take into account 
other societal factors such as the strength of the particular coun-
try's social services system, the availability of handguns, the rate 
question, while only 3% thought courts were too harsh. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1991 at 203, table 2.35 (U.S. Dep't of Justice, 
1992). 
11. The American Bar Association was stunned when its own poll, designed to show 
public attitudes toward lawyers and the legal system, found that only 40% of those polled 
had a favorable opinion of lawyers. See Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi (The Public Per-
ception of Lawyers: ABA Poll), A.B.A. J. 60, 62 (Sept. 1993). Lawyers remained ahead 
of politicians (21 %) and stockbrokers (28%), but were way behind the poll leaders, teach-
ers (84%), pharmacists (81 %), and police officers (79%). Id. Worse yet was that those 
who had had prior experience working with lawyers had a lower opinion of lawyers than 
those who had not done so. Id. 
12. Marc Mauer, Americans Behind Bars: The International Use of Incarceration, 
1992-93 at 4 (The Sentencing Project, 1994) ("The Sentencing Project 1994"). 
13. All of these statistics appear in the chart on cross-national incarceration rates in 
The Sentencing Project 1994 at 4 (cited in note 12), with the exception of the figures for 
Norway for 1993, which were obtained directly from Mr. Mauer at The Sentencing Pro-
ject. Letter from Marc Mauer, Assistant Director, The Sentencing Project, to William 
Pizzi (Sept. 26, 1995) (on file with William Pizzi). 
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of violent crime, the extent of the country's drug problem, etc., 
these dramatic figures do not tell us nearly as much about the 
criminal justice system in those countries as these figures in isola-
tion would suggest. Ken Pease, an English criminologist who has 
tried to determine the level of comparative punitiveness among 
European countries, concluded that measuring a country's puni-
tiveness according to the number of its citizens incarcerated com-
pared to the country's total population "is liable to produce 
misleading results. "14 
A recent article by Professor Richard Frase comparing sen-
tencing practices in France with those in the United States illus-
trates just how difficult it is to compare different countries, even 
when the comparison is limited to only two countries.ls He 
describes France as a country that makes "very sparing use of 
custodial penalties" and as a country with a "less punitive atti-
tude. "16 He then explains how hard it is to document statistically 
the conclusion that France is less punitive than the United States 
because, among other problems, crimes are categorized differ-
ently and data are often not comparable between the two coun-
tries or are simply unavailable.17 Doing the best he can with the 
figures, he concludes that "it seems likely that, overall, fines and 
other non-custodial sentences are used less often in the United 
States than in France," and that "[i]t may also be the case that 
custodial terms are, on the average, longer in the United 
States. "1s These are rather tenative conclusions considering that 
the incarceration rate of France is one-sixth that of the United 
States. 
This is not to claim that the United States does not punish 
criminals more severely than many or even most other western 
countries. But it is difficult to find data that would show exactly 
how much more criminals are punished in the United States and 
14. Ken Pease, Cross-National Imprisonment Rates, 34 Brit. J. Criminol. 116, 125 
(1994). 
Professor James Lynch, who has published several studies aimed at trying to deter-
mine the comparative punitiveness of different countries, warns that cross-national com-
parisons are difficult to do well: "The "foreign-ness" of culture, laws, and practices in 
other nations makes it easy to misrepresent policies and outcomes, and thereby the rela-
tive condition of nations. This misinformation distorts rather than informs policy debates 
by focusing attention on mythical problems or by overstating those that do exist." James 
Lynch, Crime in International Perspective, in James Q. Wilson and Joan Petersilia, eds., 
Crime 11 (ICS Press, 1995). 
15. Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Laws & Practices in France, 7 Fed. Sent. Rptr. 275 
(1995). 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 275-76. 
18. Id. at 277. 
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whether this is true for all crime categories19 and for all regions 
of the country. Like Professor Frase and other comparatists, I 
believe it to be the case that defendants in the United States are 
generally punished somewhat more severely than similar defend-
ants on the continent. I am also worried that whatever disparity 
exists at present may be aggravated as legislatures continue to 
enact mandatory sentences (such as the "three strikes" legisla-
tion in California) and to increase sentencing ranges generally. 
Thus, in this article I will assume what I believe to be true-that 
defendants in the United States tend to receive sentences that 
are somewhat longer than those they would receive in other 
western countries and that some defendants in the United States 
receive sentences that are much harsher than they would receive 
in Europe (including a death penalty, which does not exist in Eu-
rope). But while not denying that we have serious problems in 
our criminal justice system with the harshness of certain laws, I 
do not think it is fair to our system to use raw incarceration 
figures to suggest the system as a whole is barbaric or repressive, 
or to suggest that all defendants receive sentences in the United 
States that are terribly unfair and unjust. These comparative in-
carceration figures mean far less than they appear to mean. At a 
time when our criminal justice system has many serious 
problems, I do not think it is helpful to exaggerate the problems 
that do exist. 
II. INCARCERATION RATES AND DEFENDANTS' 
RIGHTS 
Professor Seidman presents the picture of a system in which 
constitutional protections have not done the job of protecting 
suspects, and as evidence of this, he points to our startling incar-
ceration rate. He thinks prosecutors have an easy time of it in 
the United States, with most of our protections watered down 
and full of exceptions. This logic would certainly suggest that if 
we look to European countries with low rates of incarceration we 
would see criminal justice systems that make the prosecutor's job 
19. One study, using cross-national data from the 1980's comparing the United 
States to England and what was then West Germany, concluded that prison use in the 
United States was not radically different from these other countries as far as crimes of 
serious violence were concerned, but the propensity to incarcerate and the amount of 
time served was greater in the United States than in the other nations for property and 
drug offenses. See Lynch, Crime in International Perspective at 34-38 (cited in note 14}. 
This suggests that perhaps the United States is more harsh in its sentencing practices for 
some crimes but not for others. But the data for this study seem a bit dated given the 
rapid changes in sentencing laws over the last several years, and thus it is hard to know if 
the study's conclusions are valid today. 
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much more difficult and protections for defendants that dwarf 
those that exist in the United States. 
But when you look at those systems, the relationship that 
Professor Seidman assumes exists between incarceration rates 
and protections for defendants doesn't hold at all. Consider, for 
example, the Netherlands, a country with an incarceration rate 
that is the lowest in Europe2o and with a reputation for toler-
ance21 and a tradition that has favored lenient sentencing poli-
cies.22 It is also a country that is well-known for its bold attempts 
to explore alternatives to incarceration for drug offenders, such 
as de facto legalization of soft drugs and novel measures to make 
sure addicts stay in treatment, for example, the "methadone bus" 
which brings methadone to the addict.23 
But when one looks at the Dutch system of criminal proce-
dure, one sees a system with many features that would be viola-
tive of all sorts of constitutional rights in the United States. For 
example, the level of lay participation in the decision-making 
process is easily stated: it is zero.24 There is no right to a jury or 
even to lay judges as you find elsewhere in Europe. Moreover, 
the trial places considerable emphasis on the materials gathered 
during the closed pretrial stage by the police and the investigat-
ing judge. Trials tend to center on a discussion of the materials 
contained in the dossier and place less emphasis on oral testi-
mony and the examination of witnesses in open court.2s Because 
20. See The Sentencing Project 1994 at 4 (cited in note 12). 
21. See Constantijn Kelk, Criminal Justice in the Netherlands in Phil Fennell et al., 
eds., Criminal Justice in Europe: A Comparative Study (Clarendon Press, 1995) ("Crimi-
nal Justice in Europe"). 
22. See Josine Junger-Tas, Sentencing in the Netherlands: Context and Policy, 7 Fed. 
Sent. Rptr. 293 (1995); J.F. Nijboer, The Requirement of a Fair Process and the Law of 
Evidence in Dutch Criminal Proceedings in J.F. Nijboer, C.R. Callen and N. Kwak, eds., 
Forensic Expertise and the Law of Evidence 161 (Royal Netherlands Acad. of Arts and 
Sciences, 1993); Constantijn Kelk, Laurence Koffman and Jos Silvis, Sentencing Practice, 
Policy, and Discretion in Criminal Justice in Europe at 319 (cited in note 21); L.H.C. 
Hulsman and J.F. Nijboer, Criminal Justice System in Jeroen Chorus et al., eds., Introduc-
tion to Dutch Law for Foreign Lawyers 309 (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 2d ed. 
1993). 
23. See generally Jos Silvis and Katherince S. Williams, Managing the Drug Prob-
lem: Tolerance or Prohibition in Criminal Justice in Europe at 149, 157 (cited in note 21). 
24. See Nijboer, Dutch Criminal Proceedings at 164 (cited in note 22); Nico J5rg, 
Stewart Field and Chrisje Brants, Are Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems Converging? 
in Criminal Justice in Europe at 41, 50 (cited in note 21). 
25. See Nijboer, Dutch Criminal Proceedings at 166 (cited in note 22); JOrg et al., 
Are Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems Converging? in Criminal Justice in Europe at 
50-52 (cited in note 21 ). 
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Dutch trials do not bar hearsay, there are cases in which the con-
viction is supported by statements from anonymous witnesses.z6 
The Netherlands is unusual among European countries be-
cause it remains so heavily inquisitorial at a time when most 
other European countries have moved away from such a heavy 
emphasis on the investigatory phase of the procedure. But even 
compared to other continental countries, the notion that the 
American criminal justice system makes it too easy to convict 
defendants, leading to a high incarceration rate, seems ridiculous. 
Consider two other examples, Norway and Germany, both with 
incarceration rates much lower than that of the United States. In 
Norway, as is traditional in civil law systems, the judges always 
ask the defendant, after the state's attorney has read the charges, 
if he wishes to respond to the charges. The defendant need not 
respond-he has the right to remain silent-but in such an event 
the Norwegian code provides: "If the person charged refuses to 
answer, or states that he reserves his answer, the president of the 
court may inform him that this may be considered to tell against 
him."27 Adding additional pressure to respond to the charges is 
another feature of civil law trials: trials on the continent have the 
dual function of determining sentence as well as guilt. Both is-
sues are resolved at the conclusion of the trial and announced in 
the court's judgment. The dual nature of the inquiry means that 
the defendant will not have the chance to speak prior to sentenc-
ing in the event of a conviction as would be the case in the 
United States. Thus, the fact that the trial has a dual function as 
well as that the factfinders are seeking the defendant's response 
means that defendants almost always choose to respond to the 
charges and answer the judges' questions. This means that the 
defendant is usually an important source of evidence at civil law 
trials. The fact that sentence is a possible trial issue has another 
advantage for the state's attorney: the defendant's criminal rec-
ord is directly relevant to the issue of the appropriate sentence 
26. In Kostovski v. The Netherlands, 166 Eur. a. H.R. (Ser. A) at 6 (1989}, the 
European Court of Human Rights condemned the Netherlands for having violated Arti-
cle 6(3}(d} of the European Convention on Human Rights which guarantees a citizen the 
right to examine witnesses against him. Kostovski had been found guilty of robbery solely 
on the basis of the statements of anonymous witnesses. What this decision means for civil 
law countries, in which much less emphasis is placed on the interrogation of witnesses 
because the trial is seen as an official inquiry rather than a contest between opposing 
parties, is uncertain. See Bert Swart and James Young, The European Convention on 
Human Rights and Criminal Justice in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in Crimi-
nal Justice in Europe at 57, 71-72 (cited in note 21). 
27. The Criminal Procedure Act of Norway, Ch. 9, § 93 (1991) (unofficial English 
translation). 
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and so will always be brought out, whether the defendant 
chooses to respond to the charges or not. 
Germany, like other civil law countries, accords victims of 
serious crimes (or the family of the victim in the case of homi-
cide) far greater rights at trial than is the case in the United 
States. In Germany, victims of very serious crimes, such as homi-
cide or rape, have the right to participate in the trial as a "secon-
dary accuser" which gives the victim a status nearly equal to that 
of the defense during pretrial proceedings and at trial.2s There is 
even the possibility of appointed counsel if the victim is indi-
gent.29 Because the defendant responds first to the charges, this 
means that in a rape case, for example, the defendant will give 
his account of the events before the victim has been called as a 
witness, the reverse of what it would be in the United States. As 
for removing the victim as part of a sequestration order when the 
defendant gives his account of the events, that would not be pos-
sible in Germany if the victim has chosen to participate at the 
trial because such a victim is treated like the defendant as far as 
presence in the courtroom is concerned and is entitled to remain 
in the front of the courtroom throughout the trial just like the 
defendant. Like the state's attorney or the defense attorney, the 
victim's attorney can ask questions of witnesses, suggest addi-
tional witnesses and even make a closing statement on behalf of 
the victim at the end of the trial. 
These are hurried glimpses of other systems. But even these 
glimpses suggest that something is badly amiss in the mindset 
that sees our constitutional protections as eroded to the point 
that the prosecutor has an easy time of it. On a comparative ba-
sis, civil law countries with much lower incarceration rates grant 
defendants far fewer protections than defendants receive in 
American courts. 
The same relationship exists when we move from civil law 
systems to common law systems: common law systems with much 
lower incarceration rates have far more limited protections than 
defendants would receive in the United States. In England, for 
example, the difference for defendants is apparent even in the 
position of the defendant in the courtroom. During the trial, ex-
cept if he takes the stand, the defendant must remain in the dock, 
28. See Strafprozeordnung (StPO) § 395. On the treatment of crime victims in Ger-
man courtrooms in general as well as the procedure which permits a crime victim in cer-
tain cases to participate as a secondary accuser or nebenklliger, see generally William T. 
Pizzi and Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A Comparative Perspec-
tive on American Problems, 32 Stan. J. Int. L. - (1996) (forthcoming). 
29. See StPO §§ 406g (1) and (2), 406e. 
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a small box at the very back of the courtroom where he sits, usu-
ally next to a bailiff, far removed from his barrister. There is in 
England, as in the United States, the right to self-representation, 
but unlike the United States, the defendant cannot participate 
from the well of the courtroom as if he were a member of the 
English bar. He must represent himself from the dock. The right 
to self-representation is also more limited than it is in the United 
States. In Colorado, there has been considerable difficulty in 
sexual assault cases with defendants choosing to represent them-
selves, thereby forcing victims to endure cross-examination, at 
rather close range, from the offender.Jo In one very serious case 
involving sexual abuse of children, the defendant personally 
cross-examined three of the victims, ages 10, 11, and 14.31 The 
latter problem will not occur in England as the right of a defend-
ant to personally cross-examine child victims in sexual assault 
cases has been statutorily abolished.32 
Professor Seidman complains that our fourth amendment is 
"riddled with exceptions and limitations." But I doubt that there 
is any common law country that would suppress the evidence in 
cases such as Gates or Leon, two of the cases complained about 
by Professor Seidman, where the officers were acting in good 
faith and had judicial approval based on a warrant for searches 
that resulted in the seizure of substantial amounts of drugs. In 
England, the courts have traditionally not seen it as their func-
tion to discipline police officers, believing that to be a function of 
the executive branch, not the judiciary.JJ This has been changed 
under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984. But that 
act permits courts to exclude prosecution evidence only if the ad-
mission of such evidence "would have such an adverse effect on 
the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit 
30. In 1988, Quintin Wortham was charged with a series of six rapes in Denver and 
chose to represent himself. In the middle of the trial, the judge tried to order standby 
counsel to take over the case because the defendant refused to obey court rulings. 
Standby counsel refused, arguing that she would need weeks of preparation and a mistrial 
resulted. See Howard Pankratz, Wortham Rape Trial Called a Disaster, Denver Post 1A 
(Jan. 24, 1988); Howard Pankratz, Mistrial Stalls Wortham Case After 20 Days, Denver 
Post 1A (Jan. 27, 1988). At his second trial, Wortham again represented himself, and he 
was convicted. See Howard Pankratz, 376-Year Term Reimposed for 'Capitol Hill Rapist,' 
Denver Post B4 (Apr. 9, 1994). 
31. See George Lane, Dunann Convicted on All Sex Counts, Denver Post 1A (Jan. 
29, 1993); Ginny McKibben, Boy Battles Fear, Tells of Forced Sex, Denver Post 1A (Jan. 
23, 1993). 
32. See Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Eng.) § 34A. 
33. See Michael Zander, The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 at 198-200 
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1990). 
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it. "34 Canada appears to take a somewhat similar stance, requir-
ing suppression of evidence under Section 24 of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms "if it is established that, having regard to all 
the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute."3s Under 
either standard, it is doubtful in the extreme that suppression of 
important evidence would be likely in any situation where an of-
ficer was acting in a reasonable, good faith belief in the lawful-
ness of his action. 
Professor Seidman also complains that while "the Supreme 
Court continues to insist on the ritualistic reading of Miranda 
warnings, judges have virtually gone out of the business of actu-
ally policing the voluntariness of confessions and regularly sanc-
tion the sort of coercive tactics that would have led to the 
suppression of evidence a half century ago."36 I don't know if 
this accusation is true-Professor Seidman cites no studies-but 
certainly the rights a suspect has in the United States under Mi-
randa and its progeny to halt all questioning are far stronger than 
they would be for such a suspect in England. Suspects in Eng-
land have the right to refuse to answer, but at the same time, it is 
understood that the police have the right to question. Thus, 
when a suspect refuses to answer a question, the police will often 
proceed to the next question. And while there is the right to 
representation during ·interrogation, it is not seen as the function 
of the defense solicitor to bar all interrogation, but rather to 
make sure that the questioning is fair and that the suspect is 
treated properly.37 Should a suspect refuse to answer questions, 
it will be reported at trial by the interrogating officer that the 
34. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Eng.) § 78(1). 
35. Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Can.) Section 24(2), reprinted in Gerald-A. 
Beaudoin and Ed Ratushy, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 926-34 
(Carswell, 2d. ed. 1989). 
36. Seidman, 12 Const. Comm. at 209 (cited in note 1). 
37. A booklet published by the governing body for solicitors, the Law Society, enti-
tled The Law Society's Guidelines: Advising a Suspect in the Police Station (3rd ed. 1991), 
offers guidelines that make it clear that the solicitor is not present to prevent the inter-
view but to see "that the interview is being and will be conducted fairly." See David 
Roberts, (1) Questioning the Suspect: the Solicitor's Role, 1993 Crim. L. Rev. 368, 368 
(discussing the role of the solicitor in the interrogation room and in light of the Law 
Society's guidelines). The guidelines state specifically, "the officer should be allowed to 
conduct an interview in his/her own way provided that he/she does so properly and 
fairly." I d. See also Ed Cape, Police Interrogation and Interruption, 144 New. L.J. 120 
(1994) (discussing the sort of questions that ought to prompt a solicitor to intervene on 
behalf of the client). 
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defendant was "cautioned" following his arrest and said 
nothing.3s 
Given the acceptance of a system in which the police have a 
right to ask questions of a suspect as well as a system in which the 
refusal to answer questions is often introduced at trial, it is not 
surprising that a substantially greater percentage of suspects in 
England make damaging statements to the police compared to 
the United States.39 The percentage of suspects who refuse to 
answer questions in the interrogation room is likely to shrink in 
the future because the right to silence has been drastically nar-
rowed under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 
1994.40 To mention just one change, section 34 of the act permits 
a negative inference to be drawn at trial from the failure of a 
suspect to mention any fact to the police at the time of question-
ing that the suspect could have mentioned at that time and which 
the suspect now relies on at trial.41 
The privilege against self-incrimination also provides protec-
tions for defendants in American courtrooms that have no 
equivalent in courtrooms in England (or most other common law 
countries). In Brooks v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court struck 
down a Tennessee statute that required the defendant to testify 
as the first witness on the defense case if the defendant chose to 
testify. The Court ruled that this statute violated the privilege 
against self-incrimination as well as due process, because the de-
fendant must have complete freedom to testify whenever he 
38. For some time, the issue of whether comment should be pennitted on the de-
fendant's refusal to answer questions in the interrogation room has been uncertain and 
viewed as unsatisfactory. See generally A.A.S. Zuckennan, The Principles of Criminal 
Evidence 328-32 (Clarendon Press, 1989). In Alladice, f!J7 Crim. App. 380 (1988) (Eng. 
C.A.), the Court of Appeals argued that since section 58 of the Police & Criminal Evi-
dence Act 1984 gave a suspect the right to legal advice at the station house, it was time to 
broaden the right to comment at trial on the suspect's silence in order to maintain a 
proper balance between the prosecution and the defense. With the passage of the Crimi-
nal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, that call for a broader right of comment on the 
suspect's silence has been answered and certain inferences adverse to the defense are 
permitted at trial where the suspect has refused to answer certain questions in the interro-
gation room. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
39. See Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A 
Comparison of the English and American Approaches, 38 Hast. L.J. 1, 128 (1986). 
Research conducted for the latest Royal Commission on Criminal Justice showed 
that the exercise of the right to remain silent was not a frequent event: only six to ten 
percent of suspects outside London and between fourteen and sixteen percent of suspects 
within London exercised the right to silence. See Ian Dennis, The Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act of 1994: The Evidence Provisions, 1995 Crim. L. Rev. 4, 12 n.52 (citing 
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Report, Ch. 4, para. 15). 
40. See generally Martin Wasik and Richard D. Taylor, Criminal Justice & Public 
Order Act 1994 §§ 3.6-3.18 (Blackstone Press, 1995). 
41. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 § 34 (Eng.). 
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chooses during the defense case.42 In England, the defendant has 
no right to decide when he will testify at trial. It remains the 
practice in England that the defendant must be the first witness 
for the defense if the defendant chooses to testify.4J 
III. AN ALTERNATIVE PICTURE OF Tiffi AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Professor Seidman sees the American criminal justice sys-
tem as a harsh system, and he places the blame largely on the 
failure of our system of constitutional protections, which in his 
view do not make the prosecutor's job sufficiently difficult. I 
have accepted his premise to the extent of agreeing that the 
American criminal justice system punishes defendants more se-
verely than other Western countries, but the evidence on this is-
sue is not as clear as Professor Seidman suggests. I have strongly 
disagreed with his view that our constitutional protections make 
it too easy for prosecutors to convict the guilty, and I think the 
case is fairly overwhelming that defendants have more rights and 
far stronger rights than defendants in other western countries. 
Professor Seidman seems frustrated and angry that our 
country would develop an elaborate system of constitutional 
rights that has no equivalent in other countries and, at the same 
time, punish defendants more severely than other countries, 
sometimes much more severely. But I think that it is not surpris-
ing to find extremes in procedure and punishment linked in this 
way because there is a synergy between procedure and punish-
ment such that extremes in one encourage extremes in the other 
and vice versa. It is thus not an accident that a country with a 
system of criminal procedure that is the most complicated and 
the most expensive in the western world and, if the truth be 
known, a trial system that is not very reliable, would also tum out 
to have a system that threatens, and sometimes inflicts, punish-
ments that are harsh compared to those in other countries. Such 
42. 406 u.s. 605, 611-13 (1972}. 
43. Section 79 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 provides: 
If at the trial of any person for an offence -
(a) the defence intends to call two or more witnesses to the facts of the case; 
and 
(b) those witnesses include the accused, the accused shall be called before 
the other witness or witnesses unless the court in its discretion otherwise 
directs. 
This is interpreted to permit the defense to call a formal or noncontroversial witness prior 
to the defendant, but other than such an exception, the defendant must testify first among 
any fact witnesses. See P.J. Richardson, ed., 1 Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and 
Practice 1995 § 4-318 (Sweet & Maxwell, 1995). 
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a system needs to put pressure on defendants by threatening 
them with harsh punishments if they insist on trial, so that high 
mandatory minimums, habitual offender statutes, tough sentenc-
ing guidelines, and the like are encouraged by such a procedural 
system. Essentially, the system needs to work around its own 
procedures, and in the United States this is done by accepting 
types of charge bargains and sentence bargains-even bargains 
from defendants who insist that they are innocent44-that would 
not be accepted in other systems.4s 
Harsh punishments in tum encourage even more emphasis 
on procedure. Certainly, there is no better example than the 
death penalty, where even a single mistake in jury selection by a 
trial judge invalidates the death sentence no matter how heinous 
the crimes committed by the offender or how many such crimes 
he may have committed in the past.46 The system's reluctance to 
use the death penalty translates into a requirement of technical 
perfection in capital cases that can rarely be met. This in tum 
feeds anger at the system47 and the main outlet for that sort of 
anger is to pressure legislatures for ever harsher punishments for 
criminals.48 
To understand more clearly the synergy between procedure 
and punishment and why the two would tend to extremes to-
gether, imagine a fictional country that has a criminal justice sys-
tem that leans heavily toward rehabilitation in its sentencing 
44. I question whether there is any country other than the United States that would 
permit a defendant to be sentenced to prison based on a plea in which the defendant 
insists that he is innocent of the crime to which he is pleading guilty. Such pleas are 
permitted by North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 
45. England, for example, permits plea bargaining but not negotiated sentences. 
SeeR. v. Turner (F.R.) (1970]2 Q.B. 321, 54 Crim. App. 352 (guidelines for plea bargain-
ing). See generally Richardson, 1 Archbold §§ 4-51 to 4-54 (cited in note 43). 
46. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987) (reversing judgment because trial 
court excluded a qualified juror). 
47. In my own state, Colorado, one of the harshest critics of our state supreme court 
and its decisions in the areas of search and seizure and confessions as well as decisions on 
the death penalty has been Richard Lamm, a former democratic governor, who had ap-
pointed most of the justices. In 1985, he lashed out at the court for a series of decisions 
that he felt were too protective of criminals' rights and that had the result of "releasing 
dangerous people back to the streets." See Marjie Lundstrom and Cindy Parmenter, 
State's High Court Catches Heavy Fire, Denver Post 1A (Sept. 15, 1985). More recently, 
he has attacked the court on its death penalty decisions. See Richard Lamm, Judiciary 
Has Sabotaged the State's Death Penalty, Denver Post F-1 (Mar. 13, 1994). 
48. An essay by Steve Baker, a police detective whose son was among those killed 
by Robert Alton Harris, is an example of the way anger at the system leads to calls for 
harsher penalties. In the essay, Baker describes his experiences as the father of a crime 
victim and concludes, "(t]he criminal justice equation does not include the relatives or 
friends of victims." Baker, 40 UCLA L. Rev. at 340 (cited in note 9). At the end of the 
essay, he urges "those who sit in judgment" to remember the victims and "the rights of 
the innocent." I d. at 343. 
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policy and thus takes a strongly individualized approach to sen-
tencing. The system understands that social and personal 
problems can lead to crime, so that a judge in sentencing can call 
upon a large number of well-trained social service people who 
will work hard with the offender to try to help solve problems the 
offender may have if that appears the best route to rehabilitation. 
Because the country strongly believes in rehabilitation, there are 
no sentencing guidelines or mandatory minimums because they 
would restrict the ability of judges to treat offenders as individu-
als. While there are maximum sentences for each criminal of-
fense, there are no minimum sentences for any crime, even for 
murder. Custodial sentences are sometimes imposed but they 
are considered the last resort, and when custodial sentences are 
imposed they tend to be short. Plea bargaining of the type that 
permits the prosecutor and the defense attorney to negotiate or 
compromise a sentence is not allowed.49 
Presumably, this is the sort of sentencing system that Profes-
sor Seidman would applaud. But it would be very unlikely that 
our present system of criminal procedure would ever mesh very 
well with a sentencing system that was so strongly committed to 
rehabilitation and to treating offenders as individuals. For exam-
ple, how could a system that had this outlook on offenders ever 
embrace a tough exclusionary rule? In the first place, a tough 
exclusionary rule would undercut the goal of rehabilitation in 
many cases. If the defendant has a problem, the system needs to 
be able to act on the problem before things get more serious and 
the defendant gets into more trouble. It also is inconsistent with 
the way the system is committed to understanding the behavior 
of individuals. For a judge to say to a police officer, "We don't 
care what your reasons were for the search, what pressures you 
were under at the time, or what precautions you took to assure 
the constitutionality of your actions, if it turns out there was no 
probable cause, no matter how reasonable the mistake, the evi-
dence will be suppressed," but then expect the same judge in sen-
tencing to treat the defendant as an individual by making an 
effort to learn what led this defendant into crime, is to suggest 
that human conduct should be judged by two different standards. 
49. The fictional country I have described has features in common with the Nether-
lands, though perhaps it is more the Netherlands of ten years ago as the Netherlands, like 
all western countries, seems under more and more pressure to adopt policies that are 
more punitive and retributive in nature. See Kelk et al., Sentencing Practice at 319-32 
(cited in note 22); Peter J.P. Tak, Sentencing in the Netherlands: Discretion and Disparity, 
7 Fed. Sent. Rptr. 300 (1995); Hulsman and Nijboer, Justice System at 356-58 (cited in 
note 22). 
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And wouldn't the American notion that constitutional rights 
are there to be asserted aggressively by lawyers on behalf of their 
clients have to yield in such a system? Would lawyers in such a 
system see it as important, as do American defense lawyers, to 
instruct their clients at the station house categorically not to talk 
to the police and not to waive any right or consent to anything?so 
And isn't it unlikely in the extreme that defense lawyers in such a 
system would see themselves, as it has been claimed American 
public defenders do, as "Robin Hood" figures "who do[] not al-
ways have to conform to the moral rules society reserves for 
others"st and who take pride in "stealing" cases from the 
prosecution ?s2 
In short, if we were to move to a sentencing philosophy that 
mirrors that of this fictional country and were to reform our sen-
tencing laws in conformity to that philosophy, I don't see how 
that sentencing system could survive without de-emphasizing our 
present emphasis on defendants' rights and without major 
changes in the responsibility that lawyers have to the system. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article I have taken strong issue with the claim that 
our system of constitutional protections are not nearly strong 
enough and that evidence of this is our high incarceration rate 
compared to other countries. I have tried to show that those who 
think our constitutional protections are riddled with exceptions 
or have been watered down by this or that decision of the Court 
have no perspective on our system. Compared to criminal justice 
systems in other countries, defendants in the United States have 
many procedural advantages that make the prosecutor's job 
more difficult. Among comparatists who have compared the 
American criminal justice system to other systems, it is not un-
common to conclude that if one is really guilty, one would prefer 
to be tried in the United States.s3 
But there is a downside to going to trial in the United States: 
the risks at sentencing if found guilty. Not many offenders 
choose to go to trial in the United States because few can afford 
to run the risk of being sentenced if they are found guilty. I have 
50. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, 1 Trial ManualS for the Defense of Criminal Cases 
§ 37-A at 44 (American Law Institute, 1988). 
51. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain 
Public Defenders, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1239, 1275 (1993). 
52. ld. at 1276. 
53. See John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the 
Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America 132 (Stanford U. Press, 1985). 
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suggested that this is part of the synergy between procedure and 
punishment and it ought not to surprise us that a country might 
tend to the extremes in both its procedures and its punishments. 
Like many readers, I am sure, I would like to see our sen-
tencing laws substantially reduced and prisons improved for 
those who must be incarcerated. Perhaps this is an impossible 
goal and other western countries will tend to become more puni-
tive like the United States as their crime rates rise and public 
apprehension about crime grows. But however unlikely reform 
of our sentencing laws may be, it becomes much more unlikely if 
we move in the direction Professor Seidman would like to see us 
go and substantially increase the rights that defendants have in 
our system. 
